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Abstract
In the aftermath of the recent bank-centered financial crisis it is still unclear how
much of the decline in non-financial firms’ stock prices was due to liquidity shortage,
and how much of this decline was due to lower expected consumer demand. The
stock returns are examined over nine periods between July 31, 2007 and March 31,
2010. The near-collapse of Bear Stearns and the failure of Lehman Brothers can be
both characterised as liquidity shocks that had a greater impact on financially fragile
non-financial firms. It was mostly improvement in demand expectations that positively
affected the performance of US non-financial firms in the first months of recovery. In the
later periods, however, neither amelioration in demand expectations nor improvement
of financial conditions can explain the performance of US non-financial firms.
Keywords: Stock price returns, Financial constraints, Liquidity shortage, Shock on
demand expectations.
JEL Classification Numbers: E44, G01, G12.
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Re´sume´
Suite a` la re´cente crise financie`re qui a touche´ le secteur bancaire, on ne sait toujours
pas dans quelle mesure la baisse des cours des actions des socie´te´s non financie`res s’ex-
plique par un manque de liquidite´ ou bien par une baisse de la demande anticipe´e des
consommateurs. On de´termine plusieurs pe´riodes entre le 31 juillet 2007 et le 31 mars
2010 au cours desquelles on examine les rendements des actions des entreprises non
financie`res aux E´tats-Unis. Le quasi-effondrement de Bear Stearns et la faillite de Leh-
man Brothers peuvent eˆtre tous les deux caracte´rise´s comme des chocs de liquidite´ qui
ont eu un impact plus important sur les entreprises non financie`res e´tant financie`rement
fragiles. C’e´tait surtout l’ame´lioration des anticipations de demande qui a eu un effet
positif sur la performance des entreprises non financie`res aux E´tats-Unis pendant les
premiers mois de la reprise. Apre`s ces premiers mois, cependant, ni l’ame´lioration des
anticipations de demande ni l’ame´lioration des conditions financie`res ne peuvent pas
expliquer la performance des ces entreprises.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 caused global recession that far exceeded the scope of the
losses in subprime markets. The banking sector was affected first, when asset prices started to
fall, leading to deterioration in financial institutions’ balance sheets. Thus, lending standards
and margins tightened, causing fire-sales and even more tightening in funding (Acharya et
al., 2009 ; Brunnermeier, 2009). In the same time interbank lending dried up due to the
collapse in the banks’ confidence in the soundness of other financial institutions (Von Hagen,
2009). Banks were forced to start hoarding funds even if the creditworthiness of borrowers
did not change.
This produced a large financial shock on the firms during the crisis, especially on those
who relied heavily on external financing (see Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010 for details).
Facing lower demand expectations due to the loss of consumer confidence and the higher
costs of external financing, firms had to reduce their production ; they suffered decay in their
revenues which was anticipated in their stock returns.
To address these issues, this paper studies the cross-sectional changes in stock prices of
US non-financial over nine large and small periods between July 31, 2007 and March 31,
2010. The paper aims to evaluate the influence of the shock on demand expectations as well
as the financial crunch on these firms. To identify a firm-level cross-section of sensitivities to
financial contraction and to the shock on demand expectations, two main groups of measures
are used :
1. The sensitivity to liquidity contraction is defined through the Altman’s Z-score, Moo-
dy’s RiskCalc and BondScore model components as well as through the financial
constraint index of Whited and Wu (2006). This cross-section is identified separa-
tely for each US firm prior to the crisis, in 2006, in order to limit the endogeneity
problems.
2. The sensitivity to demand shock is identified in two distinct ways :
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• As an elasticity of firm sales growth to growth in per capita personal income in
the state where the company was headquartered in the period between 1990 to
2006 ;
• From the response of firms to the terrorist attack of 9/11, which was presumably
a demand shock : as firm-level cumulative abnormal returns in the aftermath of
the attack and as a median per sector change in log stock returns in the similar
period (following Tong and Wei, 2009a and 2009b).
This paper extends Tong and Wei (2009a and 2009b) analysis using different measures of
financial constraint and demand sensitivity during different time periods. On one hand, the
short periods for stock returns are introduced to account for particular negative events as
well as recovery periods in stock markets. It is also convenient as demand sensitivity index
proposed by Tong and Wei, 2009a and 2009b is calculated for the short period of time around
2 weeks in the aftermaths of the terrorist attack of 2001. On the other hand, the period of
analysis is extended until 2010.
Instead of focusing on the Whited and Wu financial constraint indicator, other balance
sheet indicators are taken into account to identify the firm financial constraint. Besides, as
demand sensitivity index proposed by Tong and Wei (2009a and 2009b) has been criticised
for its accuracy, alternative ways to compute the demand sensitivity are suggested. Robust-
ness checks include clustering the error terms by sectors, outlier selection and comparing
continuous versus discrete time stock market returns.
The results show that in almost every analysed period, both factors - sensitivity to
the shock on demand expectations and sensitivity to financial shortage - have a significant
impact on US firms. Demand sensitivity index of Tong and Wei has the greatest explicative
power comparing to the alternative indexes. It is also found to be positively correlated with
the elasticity of firm net sales to income, another proxy of sensitivity to shock on demand
expectations, which confirms the correct intuition of the index.
Quantitatively Altman’s Z-zone indicator is more important than the shock on demand
4
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expectations index (computed from the firm reaction to the terrorist attack of 2001) in
explaining the stock price performance in almost all the studied periods. Firms which were
more vulnerable to demand contraction and more financially fragile (with smaller Z-score or
classified to a more distressed zone according to the score) prior to the crisis experienced a
larger reduction in the values of their stocks during the crisis.
Both events - the near-collapse of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers -
are characterised by liquidity contraction (financially fragile firms were affected the most) as
well as overall negative tendency of the market and its high volatility. These results confirm
those of Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) who show that the new bank loans to large borrowers
fell by 47% by the end of the fourth quarter of 2008, representing the willingness or ability
to lend during the crisis.
Cornett et al. (2010) and Del Giovane et al. (2010) also verify the link between drying
up of liquidity and decline in credit supply, and find out that financially fragile non-financial
firms should have being affected the most. The negative effect of supply factors on the growth
of lending to firms was strongest after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns
according to Del Giovane et al. (2010) and to results of this paper.
In the first month and quarter of the recovery in stock returns it was improvement in
demand expectations that had a larger impact on US non-financial firms. However, this
short-term effect did not last for a long time. Consumer spending did not increase much in
2009-2010 and the aggregate demand remained week (Feldstein, 2009). It can be also the
reason why more profitable firms before the crisis had more problems to recover after the
crisis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical background
on stock returns’ evaluation and presents the estimation methodology adopted in the paper.
Section 3 introduces the data, describes different time windows for stock returns and the
construction of explanatory variables. Empirical results for cross-section estimations of the
determinants of the US non-financial firms stock returns in the large and small windows are
5
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presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background and model specification
The profits of the firm have a direct positive impact on return on assets and return on
shareholders’ equity. These last two measures of the firm’s level of profitability are equal to
each other in case the firm does not possess any debt. However, return on equity increases
with the firm’s debt and becomes larger than the return on assets if the latter one exceeds the
rate of interest on the debt repayments. On the other side, the net return to the shareholders
comprises current dividends and capital appreciation that should be equal to the required
by shareholders rate of return according to the following arbitrage condition :
[Et(qi,t+1)− qi,t] + Et(di,t+1)
qi,t
= ri,t.
Here qi,t represents the asset price of the firm i at the end of the period t ; di,t+1 - are the
expected dividends of the firms paid at period t+1 ; ri,t is the required rate of return by
firm’s shareholders.
Solving this equation using forward iteration implies that fundamental value of an asset
is the present discounted value of expected future earnings :
qi,t = Et
[
k∑
j=1
(
1
1 + ri,j
)jdi,t+j
]
.
In this paper the cross-sectional changes in stock returns are examined for US non-financial
firms. One of the most prominent asset pricing single factor models is the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966).
It requires the risk premium on any asset to be equal to the sum of the stock’s expected
return if the market’s excess return is zero, the component of the return due to movements
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in market index and the firm specific component :
∆ ln(qi,t)− rf = αi,t +Betai [∆ ln(qM,t)− rf ] + i,t, (1)
where ∆ ln(qi,t) is the change in stock prices (measured through natural logarithms) over
several large and small windows ; ∆ ln(qM,t) is the change in stock market returns measured
through Standard and Poor’s 500 (under the hypothesis that the stock market index qM,t
represents a correct measure of the macroeconomic risk) ; rf represents the risk-free rate of
return ; i,t are the firm specific error terms, non-correlated neither with systematic risk nor
with the risk specific to another enterprise.
CAPM was augmented by additional factors. Rosenberg et al. (1985) and Chan et al.
(1991) found the evidence of significance of the ratio of a firm’s book value to market value
for the cross-section of equity returns (in the United States and Japan, respectively). Fama
and French (1993) introduced in their three-factor model both book-to-market values and
firm size. Besides, a strong positive relationship was found between common stock returns
and earning to price ratio of the NYSE firms in Basu (1983).
Another way of CAPM extension was the idea to introduce time-varying betas condi-
tional on currently available information. Ferson and Harvey (1993) explained stock returns
across world stock markets with conditional betas depending on local information variables
(dividend yields, short-term interest rates, yield spread of low-risk bonds) and global risk
premia depending on global variables. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) also used a conditio-
nal beta model and found out that the market risk premium on equities is a function of the
corporate bond credit spread. In the present paper financial constraint as well as demand
sensitivity characteristics are considered besides the rate of return on the stock market and
7
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the individual Betai in the following cross-sectional regression :
∆ ln (qi,t) = α0 + β1Betai,2001−2006 + β2BCi,2006 + β3SDSi,1990−2006 +
+ β4∆ ln(qi,t−1) + β5
Book
Market i,2006
+ s + i,t.
BCi,2006 are the balance sheet indicators that define the probability of firm’s default : Alt-
man’s Z-score, inputs for Moody’s RiskCalc and BondScore models.
SDSi,1990−2006 are sensitivity to demand shock indexes that include several measures.
First one is defined as elasticity of net sales growth to the growth in per capita personal
income in the state where the company was headquartered during 1990-2006 period prior
to financial crisis (another possibility is to measure sensitivity of firm net sales to GDP
growth of the country). The second measure is cumulative abnormal stock price returns in
the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 2001 and the third one is ∆ ln(qi,10sept′01−21sept′01)s - a
median per sector (191 sectors in total) of stock price reaction to the same event (following
Tong and Wei, 2009a and 2009b).
Besides Betai two other control variables are included in the model : ∆ ln(qi,t−1) is the
autoregressive component for the period of the same length but prior to the examined window
of stock returns ; Book
Market i,2006
is book-to-market equity ratio of the firm (following Fama and
French three-factor model) ; s are the sectoral error terms (errors terms clustered by 191
sectors), i,t are individual firm error terms.
3 Data and summary statistics
3.1 Data sources
The data set is composed of stock prices of 1058 US firms (traded at the New York Stock
Exchange) collected from Datastream and firms’ balance sheet information from Compus-
tat during 2007-2009. The choice of the country of interest is justified by the fact that the
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financial crisis originated in the United States (see the data appendix for the sample se-
lection). The sample used by Tong and Wei (2009b) is larger, it contains 2789 firms. The
sample is different due to the merge of data sets from two sources (Datastream and Com-
pustat), differences in the company names and in outlier selection procedures (see details in
appendix).
3.2 Dependent variable : different time windows for stock returns
The key idea of this paper is to examine changes in firms’ stock prices over nine periods :
four large windows (where the first one is similar to the window studied in Tong and Wei
(2009b) and, thus, will be further referred to as the TW period), two small windows following
the near-collapse of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and three small
windows when the recovery in stock indexes has begun in the markets.
In the large windows the start date is set on July 31, 2007 following the collapse on June
20, 2007 of two highly levered Bear Stearns-managed hedge funds that invested in subprime
asset-backed securities (see Acharya and Richardson, 2009 for details). This collapse was
triggered by the prices in the housing market that have stopped appreciating since 2006.
Mortgage refinancing was replaced by rising mortgage defaults in subprime sector which led
to the fall in the prices of collateralized debt obligations, fire sales and even faster declining
value of assets.
Bear Stearns hedge funds were shuttered the following month. The credit spreads on
all kind of investment bonds started to rise, and in the beginning of August, 2007 financial
crisis started to be discussed worldwide and completed by the run on BNP Paribas structured
investment vehicles on August 09, 2007.
The end of each period is determined through graphical analysis (figure 1) and identified
as a date of the trough in stock prices including the largest market failures as during the near-
collapse of Bear Stearns (week of March 10, 2008) and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
(September 15, 2008).
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Bear Stearns was the fifth-largest investment bank in the U.S. with the most leverage and
highly exposed to the subprime mortgage market (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). The fall of
Bear Stearns is also called a ”rescue” or a ”near-collapse” as the bank was finally purchased
by JPMorgan Chase with government guarantee of $29 billion of subprime securities. The
government has considered a bank to be ”too big to fail” and to carry a large systemic
risk. Thus, even though the near-collapse of Bear Stearns has had a negative impact on the
market, it was considerably less than in the case of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The mean
stock price decline is 8.5 times smaller than that in the case of Lehman Brothers (-0.07
relative to -0.59, table 1). Besides, high values of standard deviations imply some evidence
of excessive cross-sectional volatility in the stock returns.
- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE -
Lehman Brothers also contained a large systemic risk. The fact that Lehman Brothers
did not receive liquidity from the Treasury1 (at least immediately) could mean that other
investment banks were at risk as well. The ”tail” risk has realized, most of financial institu-
tions were heavily exposed to it and without Treasury’s support the whole financial system
of the U.S. was in danger. More than 90% of US non-financial firms have experienced a fall
in their stock prices in the period between July 31, 2007 and October 27, 2008.
- INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE -
Figure 1 plots the S&P 500 composite index displayed on a logarithmic scale, the slope
of the curve measuring the monthly rate of growth during the period from January 1, 2007
to October 1, 2010. The index points out several periods when stock market lost much of
its value : on March 17, 2008, on October 27, 2008, on December 01, 2008, and reached its
lowest point on March 09, 2009. The start dates in small windows are taken month or month
and a half before the trough dates.
After March 09, 2009 a slow recovery begins, expansionist and non-conventional monetary
policies having their effect on the stock market. There is a mean increase in stock returns of
1Later the Treasury drastically expanded it role as a lender of last resort (LOLR)
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0.34 during the first month (RW1), 0.44 during the first quarter of recovery (RW2) and 0.09
during the first quarter of 2010 (RW3). In the beginning of 2010 firm stock returns stabilise
and almost do not rise which is the consequence of the sluggish economic growth.
Large windows
• TW window [∆ ln(qi,TW )] July 31, 2007 until March 17, 2008 - after the fall of Bear
Stearns - duration of 7,5 months (TW window is of similar length to the one examined
by Tong and Wei (2009b)).
• LW1 [∆ ln(qi,t1)] July 31, 2007 until October 27, 2008 - after the fall of Lehman Bro-
thers - duration of 15 months.
• LW2 [∆ ln(qi,t2)] July 31, 2007 until December 01, 2008 - end of the ”crisis” year -
duration of 17 months.
• LW3 [∆ ln(qi,t3)] July 31, 2007 until March 09, 2009 - the largest drop in stock price
returns during 2007-2010 - duration of 19 months.
Small windows
• SW1 [∆ ln(qi,t4)] February 17, 2008 until March 17, 2008 - 1 month gap (Bear Stearns
fall).
• SW2 [∆ ln(qi,t5)] September 11, 2008 until October 27, 2008 - 1,5 month gap (Lehman
Brothers collapse).
Recovery in stock prices windows
• RW1 [∆ ln(qi,t6)] March 09, 2009 until April 09, 2009 - 1 month gap (first month of
recovery).
• RW2 [∆ ln(qi,t7)] March 09, 2009 until June 30, 2009 - 3 months gap (first quarter of
recovery).
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• RW3 [∆ ln(qi,t8)] January 01, 2010 until March 31, 2010 - 3 months gap (first quarter
of 2010).
3.3 Balance sheet characteristics
The question of the impact of various frictions in financial markets on financial constraint
of the firms is well investigated in the corporate finance and investment literature (Chatelain,
2002). To assess the role of financial constraints in firms’ activities, some indexes were pro-
posed : investment cash-flow sensitivities (Fazzari et al., 1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
and Rajan and Zingales (1998) indexes of constraints, Whited and Wu index of constraints
(2006). Chatelain (2000) shows that such measures of financial constraints may be misspe-
cified, however, he mostly agrees on the choice of the financial constraint determinants by
Whited (1992).
Altman’s Z-score (referred to as Z in tables, Altman, 1968) is a well-known weighted
indicator of corporate financial fragility that classifies companies from financially distressed
to financially stable ones using five financial ratios (see details in appendix). Besides, an
additional Altman’s Z-zone (referred to as ZZ in tables) indicator is constructed which it
takes values 1, 2 or 3 depending on the ”zone of discrimination” :
• if Z − score > 2.99 – ”Safe” Zone and Altman’s Z-zone is 3 ;
• if 1.80 < Z − score < 2.99 – ”Grey” Zone and Altman’s Z-zone is 2 ;
• if Z − score < 1.80 –”Distress” Zone and Altman’s Z-zone is 1.
More than 60% of the firms are found to be ”safe” according to the Z-score computed
for 2006, around 20% are classified as being in ”grey” zone, and around 15% are distressed.
More recent Moody’s KMV RiskCalc V3.1 (Dwyer et al., 2004) is the Moody’s rating
agency model for predicting probability of the bank default. It comprises financial state-
ment variables and equity market information on the bank’s prospects and business risk.
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Financial ratios are classified in one of the next groups : capital structure, profitability, as-
set concentration, liquidity and asset quality. The weight of each variable is then calculated
using non-parametric techniques and the estimated default frequency is computed for each
bank.
As expected default frequency measures as well as the formula for computing them are not
available in public access, the input variables of Moody’s model are plugged directly in the
regressions (taking into account multicollinearity issues with indicators from other models).
Some exact ratios that are proposed by Moody’s model were not available on Datastream,
thus, proxies for these variables and ratios have been used.
Variables from this model that are expected to increase the firm default risk are those
that have a negative impact on the firm’s performance and enlarge the firm’s loses during
the crisis.
BondScore Credit Model is another model that calculates credit risks for all U.S. non-
financial corporations with total assets in excess of $250 millions and publicly traded equity.
BondScore Model inputs are described in table 2.
-INSERT TABLE 2 HERE -
Whited and Wu index identifies financial constraint for each firm individually depending
on several balance sheet characteristics (see appendix for details).
Altman’s Z-score includes similar indicators as those used in Moody’s RiskCalc model
that is confirmed by the correlation coefficients (0.3 between Z-score and retained earnings
to current liabilities ratio ; -0.41 between Z-score and ratio of current liabilities to sales, table
3). In general, Z-score is higher when long-term debt and current liabilities of the firm are
lower.
Higher share of retained earnings, return on assets and liquidity are associated with
smaller loses of non-financial firms during the crisis. Higher leverage indicates a greater
decline in stock prices of the firms. These conclusions are in line with assumptions from
probability of default models.
13
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-INSERT TABLE 3 HERE -
In most of the windows correlation between firm stock returns and Z-zone index is larger
than that between stock returns and Z-score indicator (0.24 and 0.15 respectively in LW3
period, table 4). In its absolute value it is similar to the correlation between firms’ stock
returns and sensitivity to demand shock measured through the reaction of firm stock prices
to the terrorist attack of 2001 (it reaches 0.28 in RW1 period).
-INSERT TABLE 4 HERE -
Everything else being equal, more financially fragile non-financial firms are expected
to exhibit greater loses during the crisis. Thus, periods in which such firms are significantly
affected can be characterised by scarcity of the sources of external financing. By construction,
all the variables are taken at the end of 2006, which helps to avoid the endogeneity problem.
3.4 Sensitivity to the shock on demand expectations
Several indexes are constructed to measure firms’ sensitivities to the shock on demand
expectations (table 5).
-INSERT TABLE 5 HERE -
First measure is the elasticity of firm sales growth to growth in per capita personal income
in the state where the company was headquartered in the period between 1990 and 2006.
The idea beyond the index is to estimate the impact of an increase in per capita income on
net sales of the firm during 16 years prior to crisis (see appendix for details). As per capita
income directly affects the demand, this coefficient can be interpreted as a sensitivity of the
firm to changes in demand expectations. As an alternative, the sensitivity of net sales to
changes in GDP is estimated during the same period.
The second family of measures is based on the idea of Tong and Wei (2009a and 2009b)
to interpret the terrorist attack of 09/11 as an event that produced a short-lived shock on
demand expectations in the market. As the Report for Congress (Makinen, 2002) emphasizes,
first it was expected that demand would be seriously affected. The GDP of the US contracted
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.71
in the third quarter of 2001, but then the positive growth resumed in the 4th quarter. That
suggests that any effects from the 9/11 on aggregate demand expectations were short-lived.
Thus, the terrorist attack is referred to as a large negative shock on demand expectations
rather than an effective shock on the real output actually taking place the next year.
The shock of the 9/11 terrorist attack did not spread in financial markets and did not
cause the shortage of liquidity : the Federal Reserve took appropriate actions to avert financial
panic. Financial assistance and supplementary access to the loans were provided for the
businesses. Tong and Wei (2009b) test that hypothesis and find out that the stock market
reaction in the aftermath of the attack was not due to the worsened conditions on the
financial markets, and thus, it could be interpreted as a fall in demand expectations.
Two measures of the stock price reaction in the aftermath of the terrorist attack are used
in the regressions : the cumulative abnormal returns and the change in stock prices in the
short period after the attack.
The cumulative abnormal returns are mostly used in the event study methodology to
assess the response of some firm/institution to the negative event. The event date in this
study is the first trading date after the terrorist attack of 09/11 : September, 17th of 2001.
The stock exchanges in the U.S. have been closed on September, 11 of 2001 (the day of the
attack) and they have remained closed for another three days. The event window includes 5
trading days before and following the attack, thus, a total of 11 days. The estimation window
is from 500 trading days to 15 days prior to the event date, which corresponds the year of
2000 and the first half of 2001 (see appendix for details).
As an alternative measure, the difference in log stock prices is calculated between Septem-
ber 10, 2001 and September 21, 2001. The median per sector is then taken as a sector-level
index of sensitivity to the shock on demand expectations. Originally in the paper of Tong
and Wei (2009b) the index is calculated for the period of 18 days, in this article the window
is reduced to 11 days (see data appendix for details) as the lowest point in stock markets
was reached on September 21, 2001 (figure is available on demand).
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Financial shortage may cause demand contraction and vice versa (Bashar, 2011). During
liquidity crises banks try to restrict their lending to very short maturities and to increase
the interest rates for term loans. Facing worsening financial conditions, firms cut their costs
which in a large part include salaries of their workers. Consequently, demand should be
deteriorated in the nearest future. However, demand declines in a proportion larger than the
fall in the salaries of workers. The reason is that future expectations change rapidly, and the
anticipations of future productivity and profits of the enterprises fall significantly.
In the present paper such an interdependence is avoided by construction : the indexes of
financial constraint and sensitivity to shock on demand expectations are calculated prior to
2007.
The elasticities of firm sales to personal income and real GDP of the U.S. are positively
correlated with cumulative abnormal returns and stock returns in the aftermath of the terro-
rist attack of 2001 (0.34 and 0.17 respectively, column 2, table 6). That at some point proves
the accuracy of intuition behind Tong and Wei idea of using the terrorist attack of 2001 as
a presumable shock on demand expectations.
Besides, indexes of demand sensitivity are positively correlated with beta. This relation-
ship is logical as firms that are more sensitive to changes in demand are expected to be more
correlated with the rest of the market.
-INSERT TABLE 6 HERE -
4 Cross-section estimations of the non-financial stock
returns determinants
4.0.1 Stock returns in the TW window and other large windows (over 15 to 19
months of the financial crisis)
TW window
The results for TW window (columns 3 and 4, table 7) are presented together with the
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original results from the Tong and Wei paper of 2009 (columns 5 and 6, table 7).
Regressions are conducted using stepwise backward selection method. This method begins
with initial model and then compares the explanatory power of smaller models by removing
nonsignificant variables. The significance level for removal is 0.05. All explanatory variables
are standardised which makes the size of parameters comparable within each column.
- INSERT TABLE 7 HERE -
The results for that window are close to those of Tong and Wei. However, in the sample
from this article White and Wu financial constraint index is not performing well. Firms with
higher returns on assets P1 prior to crisis performed better (by 6.7%, column 3, table 7)
than the rest of the market, while firms with higher stock volatility V ol experienced a larger
decline (by 6%, column 3, table 7) during TW period.
If firm net sales have been more sensitive to changes in personal income before 2007,
the firm lost 5.2% (column 3, table 7) more in its stock value during the TW period of the
crisis. At the same time, if firm stock prices have been more sensitive to the drop in demand
expectations in 2001, the firm lost additional 5.1% (column 3, table 7) in its stock prices
during the analysed period.
Other large windows
The results for other large windows are presented in table 8.
- INSERT TABLE 8 HERE -
Firms that according to their Z-score calculated for 2006 have been considered to be
”safer” than the others (and accordingly have had a higher Z-score) performed better during
the crisis than those that have been categorised as belonging to ”grey” or ”distress” zone
and have had a lower Z-score (for more details, see section 3.4). An improvement in firm’s
Z-score in a way that the firm is transferred from the more distressed zone to the safer zone
in the large period LW1 from July 31, 2007 until October 27, 2008 (column 3, table 8) is
associated with an improvement in its stock returns by 10.9%.
Higher liquidity (Liq in table 8) and EBITDA margin (EM) prior to crisis are associated
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with a better performance of the firm during the crisis, while higher volatility (V ol) of firm’s
stocks before the crisis led to a larger decline in stock prices during the crisis.
These results confirm the negative impact of financial constraints on the firm performance,
especially during the crisis. As a consequence, such financially constrained firms cut more
investment, technology, marketing, and employment relative to financially unconstrained
firms during the crisis (Campello et al., 2009 ; Musso and Schiavo, 2008).
Beta shows an important negative influence on the stock market returns in three large
periods (columns 4, 6 and 8, table 8) : in the large window LW1 from July 31, 2007 until
October 27, 2008 its explicative power is two times larger than that of Z-zone indicator or
demand sensitivity indexes. Stock prices of correlated with the market firms fell more during
the crisis.
As CAPM model predicts the larger is the fall of the stock market index, the larger should
be the parameter of the beta in the cross-sectional regressions (see equation 1). It turns out
to be the case ; the largest fall of the stock market returns on figure 1 corresponds to the
largest values of the parameters for three long periods (columns 4, 6, 8, table 8), (figure 1).
Among demand sensitivity indexes only reaction to the terrorist attack of 2001
(∆ ln(qi,′01)s in table 8) is significant and robust in all the periods. In the window LW1
an increase in ex ante sensitivity to shock on demand expectations by one standard devia-
tion is associated with an extra drop in stock price by 10.8% (6% when control variables are
included).
R-squared is in between 18% and 43.5% which is considered to be a good fit of the model
when explaining stock returns.
4.1 Stock returns over 1 to 1.5 months following the Bear Stearns
near-collapse and the failure of Lehman Brothers
Now regressions are run on stock returns in small windows around two particular events :
the near-collapse of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
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- INSERT TABLE 9 HERE -
Firms from ”safe” zone experienced a smaller decline in stock prices during these periods.
Besides, volatility indicator (V ol in table 9) has an important negative impact on the U.S.
firm stock prices. Beta (Beta in table 9) is quantitatively very important in Lehman Brothers
period (SW2) which may be explained by spillover effects of Lehman collapse on the financial
markets that confirms ”too big to fail” argument. The overall market performance was hit by
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy causing larger loses for more correlated with the market companies.
Musso and Schiavo (2008) found that financial constraints might be positively related to pro-
ductivity growth in the short-term during the crisis due to cuts in costs. However, even if this effect
exists, it is not presented in firm’s stock returns.
Thus, both events - the near-collapse of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
- are characterised by liquidity contraction (financially fragile firms were affected the most) as well
as overall negative tendency of the market and its high volatility. These results confirm arguments
of Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) who show that the new bank loans to large borrowers fell by
47% by the end of the fourth quarter of 2008, representing the willingness or ability to lend during
the crisis.
Cornett et al. (2010) and Del Giovane et al. (2010) confirm the link between drying up of
liquidity and decline in credit supply, which also suggests that financially fragile non-financial firms
should have being affected the most. The effect of supply factors on the growth of lending to firms
is the strongest after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as it is also found by Del Giovane et al.
(2010) and after the Bear Stearns near-collapse.
4.2 Stock returns over 1 to 3 months during the recovery period
following March, 2009
In this section three small periods during which the stock market indexes restarted to rise are
analysed. Table 10 presents the results for regressions with and without controls for these three
windows.
- INSERT TABLE 10 HERE -
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In the first RW1 (first month of recovery) and second period RW2 (first quarter of recovery) more
sensitive to the shock on demand expectations firms (higher ∆ ln(qi,′01)s) had a better performance
than the rest of the market. Its quantitative importance is partly offset by beta but index remains
significant after inclusion of control variables. An increase in the sensitivity of the firms to the shock
on demand expectations by one standard deviation prior to crisis led to the additional recovery of
2.3% (column 4, table 10) in the stock prices of these firms in the RW1 period. That allows to make
a conclusion that in the first quarter of recovery there was an improvement in demand expectations
in the market that positively affected the performance of U.S. non-financial firms.
However, this short-term effect did not last for a long time. Consumer spending did not increase
much in 2009-2010 and the aggregate demand remained week (Feldstein, 2009). It can be also the
reason why more profitable firms before the crisis had more problems to recover after the crisis.
Beta (Beta in table 10) coefficients change their signs to the positive ones in all three recovery
periods. Due to the overall positive tendency of the market, firms with higher beta (whose stock
prices are more correlated with the market) experienced a larger increase in their stock returns.
Firms with higher profits before the crisis did not grow as well as the rest of the market in
RW1 period, as well as in RW3 period (from January 01, 2010 until March 31, 2010). In the RW3
period another demand sensitivity index - cumulative abnormal return at the period of the terrorist
attack of 2001 - becomes significant, predicting lower rates of growth in stock prices of firms which
have had higher abnormal returns in 2001. It could be related to a slow recovery of demand and
production that did not increase as it was expected after all the stimulus measures undertaken in
2008-2009 and to the sluggish economy growth in general.
Firms with higher returns on assets (P1) exhibit smaller growth in their stock prices during
RW3 period which can be related to the size of the firms - bigger firms recover slower than the rest
of the market (it can be also the consequence of the sluggish economic growth).
First robustness check consists of removing the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of
dependent variable in order to avoid excessive size of the outliers. Besides, the discrete growth rates
are calculated. Both alternative regressions confirm the main results.
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5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the framework that assesses the relative importance of financial and
demand shocks proposed by Tong and Wei (2009a and 2009b). The performance of US non-financial
enterprises is analysed through changes in their stock price returns during the recent financial crisis.
In this article stock price returns are examined in eight different periods and that of Tong and Wei
(2009b).
The performance of Whited and Wu financial constraint index is poor, while other financial
distress indicators (Altman’s Z-score, liquidity ratio from Moody’s RiskCalc model, volatility index
from BondScore model) have better explicative power.
Quantitatively Altman’s Z-zone indicator is more important than the shock on demand expec-
tations index (computed from the firm reaction to the terrorist attack of 2001) in explaining the
stock price performance in almost all the studied periods. Firms which were more vulnerable to de-
mand contraction and more financially fragile (with smaller Z-score) prior to the crisis experienced
a larger reduction in the values of their stocks during the crisis.
More correlated with the market firms suffer from a larger decline in their stock prices during
the recession period but also gain their value faster in the recovery periods. Firms that were not
growing fast in terms of stock prices before the crisis lost more during the recession period but they
also gained more in their value during the recovery periods.
Both events - the near-collapse of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers - are
characterised by liquidity contraction (financially fragile firms were affected the most) as well as
overall negative tendency of the market and its high volatility. The negative effect of supply factors
on the lending to non-financial firms growth was strongest after the Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers near-collapse according to results of this paper.
In the first month and quarter of the recovery of the stock returns it was improvement in the
demand expectations that had a larger impact on US non-financial firms. However, this short-term
effect did not last for a long time. Consumer spending did not increase much in 2009-2010, the
aggregate demand remained week.
These findings can be potentially important for policy implications. Most of the negative events
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include both shocks on demand expectations and financial contraction. However, one of these two
shocks may have a heavier negative effect on the market, affecting in a larger way more sensible to
that shock firms. Understanding the transmission channels and correctly anticipating which shock
will prevail in the market is essential to design appropriate macroeconomic policies.
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Appendices
A Sample selection
The data set consists of firms’ stock returns and betas from Datastream 2 and balance sheet
information of the firms from Compustat 3. To select the sample, firms are classified by their SIC
- Standard Industrial Classification codes. Financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and
regulated utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) are excluded from the sample. The next step
consists of deleting any firm observation with missing data or zero stock prices or total assets. The
firms that were created after 2001 are eliminated, which is required by construction one type of
sensitivity indexes to the shock on demand expectations.
Besides, there were several sectors which were directly affected by the 09/11 terrorist attack :
airlines, defence and insurance. At the time of the 9/11, airlines industry was already in troubles
due to recession and the terrorist attack severely compounded the industry’s financial problem.
Even the quickly organised aid package did not save some firms from collapsing. The loss of life and
property gave rise to the largest claim in history, estimated for up to 40 billion US dollars - a huge
burden for the insurance sector. Hence, firms that belong to these sectors are eliminated from the
sample as the fall in their stock prices reflects the direct financial loses of these companies rather
than their reaction to the drop in demand expectations. After the firms’ preliminary selection the
sample consists of 1612 US firms.
Other financial ratios (from Moody’s RiskCalc U.S. firms model and BondScore model) are also
cleaned by deleting extreme observations or winsorizing them at 1-2% level. Most of financial ratios
are also standardised.
2Datastream - on-line historical database service provided by Thomson Financial that encompasses a
broad range of financial entities and instruments with global geographical coverage.
3Compustat - Standard & Poor’s database of financial, statistical and market information on active and
inactive companies throughout the world.
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B Construction of the variables
B.1 The balance sheet characteristics associated with firm finan-
cial constraint
• Altman’s Z-score
Altman’s Bankruptcy model suggests an index based on the five main financial ratios where
weight of each variables defined using discriminant analysis :
Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 + 0.999X5
where X1 is the ratio of difference between current assets and current liabilities to total
assets ; X2 is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets ; X3 is the ratio of earnings before
interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets ; X4 is the ratio of market value of equity to total
liabilities ; X5 is the ratio of sales to total assets.
• BondScore model indicators
Liquidity ratio is a Quick Ratio taken directly from Datastream and is defined as follows :
CurrentAssets−Inventory
CurrentLiabilities .
Volatility of cash flow is calculated as a standard deviation of EBITDAAssets over 1996-2006.
• Whited and Wu financial constraint index identifies firm’s financial constraint de-
noted FCi,2006 as the shadow value of external financing that is predicted by six variables :
FCi,2006 = −0.091 · CFi,2006
Ai,2006
− 0.062 ·Divi,2006 + 0.021 · LTDebti,2006
Ai,2006
−0.044 · ln(Ai,2006) + 0.102 · IGs,2006 − 0.035 · FGi,2006,
where FCi,2006 financial constraint index of Whited and Wu (2007) computed for each US
firm ;
CFi,2006
Ai,2006
ratio of cash flow to total assets of the firm ; Divi,2006 dividend dummy that
is the indicator which takes the value of 1 if the firm pays cash dividends, 0 otherwise ;
LTDebti,2006
Ai,2006
ratio of long-term debt to total assets of the firm ; ln(Ai,2006) natural logarithm of
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total assets of the firm ; IGs,2006 one year three-digit sector sales growth ; FGi,2006 one year
firm sales growth.
B.2 Sensitivity indexes to demand shock
Defining sensitivity indexes through elasticity :
– Elasticity of firm net sales growth to growth in per capita personal
income in the state where the company is headquartered in the period between 1990
and 2006 :
∆NSi,1990−2006 = αi + βi∆ ln(PCIST,1990−2006) + i,1990−2006
where βi = PCI =  ∆NSi,1990−2006
∆PCISt,1990−2006
is the slope or sensitivity of change in net sales to
the change in per capita income (PCI) of the state.
– Elasticity of firm net sales growth to U.S. real GDP during 1990-2006 :
∆NSi,1990−2006 = αi + βi∆ ln(GDPUS,1990−2006) + i,1990−2006
where βi = GDP =  ∆NSi,1990−2006
∆RGDPUS,1990−2006
is the slope or sensitivity of change in net sales
to GDP growth.
Defining sensitivity through the reaction to the terrorist attack of 09/11 :
– Cumulative abnormal returns in the event window of 5 trading days before and
after the attack (a total of 11 days). For each firm stock price the daily abnormal
return is calculated as a difference between the actual returns and the expected returns
estimated from the single-factor market model :
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + i,t
where market index Rm,t is S&P 500 stock market index. Cumulative abnormal returns
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CARi,Sept04′01−Sept21,′01 (CARi,′01 in the tables) for each firm are then calculated as the
sum of daily abnormal returns in the event window.
– The difference in log stock prices between September 10, 2001 and September
21, 2001 (following Tong and Wei, 2009a and 2009b). First the percentage change in
stock prices (that is the difference in log stock prices) is calculated for the period from
September 10, 2001 to September 21, 2001. Then the firms are organised in sectors and
the mean of log stock price changes for each three-digit sector is taken as the sector-level
sensitivity to the shock on demand expectations ∆ ln(qi,10sept′01−21sept′01)s (∆ ln(qi,′01)s
in the tables).
B.3 Control variables
– Autoregressive component captures persistance of firm’s stock returns. It is com-
puted as a difference in stock prices in the period of the same length but prior to the
examined window of stock returns.
The value at the end of the period is always deducted from the value at the beginning
of the period, the interpretation of the variable is the next one : the higher is the value
of the autoregressive component, the larger was the fall in stock returns of the firm
during the analysed past period (in case of falling stock prices) or the smaller was the
stock price growth (in case of increasing stock prices). In a similar way autoregressive
variable is calculated separately for every period.
– Beta is the quantitative measure of the volatility of a given stock relative to the overall
market. The beta factor in Datastream is calculated over a 5-year period using monthly
observations on logarithmic scale.
– Book-to-market ratio is the book value of the firm (accounting value) divided by
the market value (market capitalisation) of the firm.
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Table 1: The summary statistics of changes in stock returns for U.S. non-financial
firms
Period Variable Name Obs Mean SD Min Max
TW window
TW Change in stock prices (July 31, 2007 –
March 17, 2008)
∆ ln(qi,TW ) 1025 -0.26 0.34 -1.60 0.53
Autoregressive component TW (De-
cember 15, 2006 – July 31, 2007), stan-
dardised
∆ ln(qi,TW−1) 1025 0 1 -2.96 3.56
Large windows
LW1 Change in stock prices (July 31, 2007 –
October 27, 2008)
∆ ln(qi,t1) 1022 -0.8 0.6 -3.46 0.35
Autoregressive component 1 (April 28,
2006 – July 31, 2007), standardised
∆ ln(qi,t1−1) 1022 0 1 -2.6 3.87
LW2 Change in stock prices (July 31, 2007 –
December 01, 2008)
∆ ln(qi,t1) 1022 -0.94 0.7 -3.61 0.39
Autoregressive component 2 (March
28, 2006 – July 31, 2007), standardised
∆ ln(qi,t2−1) 1022 0 1 -2.6 3.87
LW3 Change in stock prices (July 31, 2007 –
March 09, 2009)
∆ ln(qi,t3) 1020 -1.19 0.85 -4.6 0.22
Autoregressive component 3 (Decem-
ber 31, 2005 – July 31,2007), standar-
dised
∆ ln(qi,t3−1) 1020 0 1 -2.84 3.5
Small windows
SW1 Change in stock prices (February 17,
2008 – March 17, 2008) – The Bear
Stearns near-collapse
∆ ln(qi,t4) 1031 -0.07 0.11 -0.43 0.23
Autoregressive component 4 (January
17, 2008 – February 17,2008), standar-
dised
∆ ln(qi,t4−1) 1030 0 1 -4.41 3.61
SW2 Change in stock prices (September 11,
2008 – October 27, 2008) – The Leh-
man Brothers failure
∆ ln(qi,t5) 1019 -0.59 0.32 -1.79 0.043
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
Period Variable Name Obs Mean SD Min Max
Autoregressive component 5 (July 26,
2008 – September 11, 2008), standardi-
sed
∆ ln(qi,t5−1) 1019 0 1 -2.49 3.80
Recovery in stock prices
RW1 Change in stock prices (March 09, 2009
– April 09, 2009) - the first month of
positive growth
∆ ln(qi,t6) 1011 0.34 0.22 -0.29 1.18
Autoregressive component 6 (February
09, 2009 – March 09, 2009), standardi-
sed
∆ ln(qi,t6−1) 1011 0 1 -2.33 3.57
RW2 Change in stock prices (March 09, 2009
– June 30, 2009)- the first quarter of
positive growth
∆ ln(qi,t7) 1023 0.44 0.84 -9.48 7.6
Autoregressive component 7 (Novem-
ber 10, 2008 – March 09, 2009), stan-
dardised
∆ ln(qi,t7−1) 1023 0 1 -3.53 3.66
RW3 Change in stock prices (January 01,
2010 – March 31, 2010)
∆ ln(qi,t8) 1025 0.09 0.2 -1.77 1.69
Autoregressive component 8 (October
01, 2009 – January 01, 2010), standar-
dised
∆ ln(qi,t8−1) 1025 0 1 -3.39 2.78
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Table 2: Summary of balance sheet characteristics used to identify the financial
constraints for U.S. non-financial firms
Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Altman’s Z-score
CurrentAssets2006−CurrentLiabilities2006
TotalAssets2006
X1 1025 0.28 0.21 -0.09 0.8
RetainedEarnings2006
TotalAssets2006
X2 1025 0.11 0.7 -2.99 0.93
EBIT2006
TotalAssets2006
X3 1025 0.09 0.09 -0.17 0.30
MarketV alueofEquity2006
TotalLiabilities2006
X4 1025 0 0.98 -1.93 1.90
Sales2006
TotalAssets2006
X5 1025 1.15 0.83 0 7
Z-score Z 1025 1.19 1.43 -2.10 5.4
Z-zone ZZ 1025 2.56 0.7 1 3
Z-zone,
standardised
ZZ 1025 0 1 -2.21 0.62
Moody’s RiskCalc U.S.
LongTermDebt2006
LTD+NetWorth2006
,
standardised
L1 1025 0 1 -1.23 3.80
RetainedEarnings2006
CurrentLiabilities2006
,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
L2 1025 0 1 -3.47 1.69
RetOnAssets2006,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
P1 1025 0 1 -3.28 2.58
∆RetOnAssets′04−′06,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
P2 1025 0 1 -2.71 3.66
CashF low2006
InterestExpense2006
,
winsorized at 3%level, standardised
DC 1025 0 1 -0.64 3.47
CashMarketSec2006
TotalAssets2006
,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
Liq 1025 0 1 -0.94 3.00
Inventories2006
Sales2006
,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
A1 1025 0 1 -1.22 3.5
∆AccountRecSales ′04−′06,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
A2 1025 0 1 -2.85 3.5
CurrentLiabilities2006
Sales2006
,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
A3 1025 0 1 -1.36 3.6
SalesGrowth2006,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
G 1025 0 1 -2.6 3.52
Size2006,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
S 1025 0 1 -2.45 2.23
BondScore U.S.
EBITDA2006
Sales2006
,
winsorized at 2%level, standardised
EM 1025 0 1 -3.45 2.62
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales2006
TotalAssets2006
,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
AT 1025 0 1 -1.36 3.54
Debt2006
MarketCap+BookV alueDebt2006
,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
L 1025 0 1 -1.09 2.88
QuickRatio2006,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
QR 1025 0 1 -0.93 3.63
V olatility2006,
standardised
V ol 1025 0 1 -1.98 3.37
White and Wu index
WW2006,
winsorized at 1%level, standardised
WW 1025 0 1 -2.33 2.5
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Table 5: Summary of the indexes of sensitivity to demand shock
Variable Name Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max
Elasticity of firm sales growth to
growth in state per capita income
during 1990-2006, winsorized at 1%
and standardised
PCI 1025 0 1 -2.21 3.38
Elasticity of firm sales growth to
growth in US real GDP in 1990-
2006, winsorized at 1% and standar-
dised
GDP 1025 0 1 -1.86 3.37
Cumulative abnormal stock price re-
turns in the event window of 5 tra-
ding days before and after the ter-
rorist attack of 09/11, winsorized at
2% and standardised
CARi,′01 1205 0 1 -1.20 3.48
Mean of change in log stock
prices between September 10, 2001-
September 21, 2001, computed by
sector, winsorized at 1% and stan-
dardised
∆ ln(qi,′01)s 1025 0 1 -3.81 3.58
Table 6: Correlation between the sensitivity indexes to demand shock and control variables
for U.S. non-financial firms
Variable PCI GDP CAR ∆ ln(qi,′01)s ∆ ln(qi,TW−1) Beta BookMarket
PCI 1.00
GDP 0.62 1.00
CAR 0.34 0.35 1.00
∆ ln(qi,′01)s 0.17 0.15 0.02 1.00
∆ ln(qi,TW−1) 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.05 1.00
Beta 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.20 -0.05 1.00
Book
Market
-0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
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Table 7: Change in Stock Prices during the Subprime Crisis, US non-financial firms, cross-
sectional OLS estimation for TW large window
Type Name TW window TW window Tong and Wei
(2009b)
Tong and Wei
(2009b)
July 31, 2007 -
Mar 17, 2008
July 31, 2007 -
Mar 17, 2008
July 31, 2007 -
Mar 31, 2008
July 31, 2007 -
Mar 31, 2008
Balance sheet char-s
Moody’s P1 0.067*** 0.055***
RiskCalc (3.08) (2.75)
BondScore V ol -0.06*** -0.053***
(-3.97) (-3.46)
Whited WW -0.117*** -0.123***
and Wu (-14.23) (-5.32)
Demand PCI -0.052** -0.060***
Sensitivity (-2.89) (-3.57)
∆ ln(qi,′01)s -0.051** -0.044** -0.037*** -0.034***
(-4.162) (-3.29) (-2.79) (-3.87)
Control ∆ ln(qi,t−1) -0.062*** 0.002***
variables (-3.80) (6.67)
Beta -0.029* 0.030**
(-2.38) (2.43)
Book
Market
-0.041* -0.064***
(-2.54) (-10.11)
Constant -0.290*** -0.272*** -0.523*** -0.519***
(-17.02) (-2.38) (-21.11) (-16.75)
R2 0.111 0.165 0.07 0.14
Obs 1024 1023 2761 2410
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses ; ***, ** and * denote p-value less than 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively
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Figure 1: S&P 500 composite index displayed on a logarithmic scale from January 1, 2007
to October 1, 2010
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